Cyber is investigating its cross-chain bridge after 5,213,000 CYBER tokens were minted unexpectedly on Solana and the same quantity was released from an Ethereum lockbox on November 21.

The public transactions establish the token movements, while attributable analysis from Bitquery indicates that Solana accepted bridge messages that Cyber’s source chain had not sent. Bitquery concluded that the messages carried a signature from the route’s accepted verifier key. The blockchain record cannot establish how anyone obtained that signing authority, who controlled the resulting wallets or whether additional infrastructure was compromised.

Cyber has not published a technical postmortem, confirmed a final financial loss or attributed the activity to a person or group. Those gaps make the event an active investigation rather than a settled account of a bridge exploit.

What the ledgers show

Bitquery reviewed the relevant Solana, Ethereum and Cyber-chain records through 10:00 UTC on November 22. Its analysis found that Cyber’s chain had sent 329 messages to the Solana route, but Solana approved messages numbered 330 and 331 anyway. Message 331 minted 5,213,000 CYBER at approximately 16:13 UTC on November 21.

About one minute later, the receiving wallet burned the tokens on Solana and initiated a bridge transfer to Ethereum. At 16:15 UTC, Cyber’s Ethereum adapter released 5,213,000 existing CYBER tokens to a new address. Cyber’s own documentation identifies that adapter contract and the corresponding Solana token and bridge-program addresses.

The adapter held approximately 5,213,905 CYBER immediately before the release and about 905 afterward, according to Bitquery’s reconstruction of the contract’s transfer history. Those are token balances, not dollar-loss measurements. Subsequent ordinary bridge activity raised the balance to 6,696 CYBER by Bitquery’s 10:00 UTC cutoff, so the later figure should not be read as recovery of the released tokens.

Bitquery traced sales and transfers that culminated in 575.286 ETH moving to another wallet at 17:40 UTC. That ether amount is an on-chain balance flow, not a final recoverable-loss figure, and wallet ownership remains unattributed. Coinburn is therefore not converting it into dollars: doing so would introduce an additional price timestamp and liquidity assumption into an already developing incident.

Why the bridge design matters

A lock-and-mint bridge normally holds original tokens on one chain while creating corresponding representations on another. When users return, the representation is burned and the locked asset is released.

In this case, the return trip from Solana behaved like a normal bridge transaction because the newly minted tokens were burned before the Ethereum adapter paid out. The disputed step came earlier: Bitquery says the Solana route accepted messages absent from Cyber’s source-chain sequence.

The analysis found that one verifier signature was sufficient for that route and that the disputed messages were signed by a key also used for legitimate messages. A matching signature establishes use of the accepted key; it does not reveal whether the key was stolen, exposed through an operator, misused by an authorized party or reached through another failure.

Restrictions and unresolved risk

The Defiant reported that Upbit and Bithumb suspended CYBER deposits and withdrawals after citing indications of a security incident, while trading remained available. Exchange restrictions are protective operational measures, not proof of the incident’s cause or size.

Bitquery also found a later message, numbered 332, approved but not executed by its November 22 cutoff. That observation could change as the chains advance. Cyber still needs to identify the affected routes, explain control of the verifier, establish whether the bridge is safely contained and account for any user exposure.

Until a postmortem or independently audited remediation appears, the verified conclusion is narrow: an unexpected Solana mint was followed by a matching Ethereum lockbox release, and public-chain analysis found messages outside the source chain’s recorded sequence. The mechanism of key exposure and the bridge’s current safety remain unverified.

Primary sourceBitquery on-chain investigation of the Cyber bridge incident ↗

The complete source packet and revision history are retained with the newsroom record.

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Financial-risk note

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