The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has opened a federal rulemaking that would require covered U.S. financial institutions to reject certain transfers involving foreign companies controlled by the A7 Network, including transfers of convertible virtual currency.

FinCEN announced the action on October 1, 2026. The proposal entered the Federal Register on October 5, beginning a comment period that runs through November 4. It remains a proposal: the publication created no new transfer prohibition by itself, and FinCEN would need to complete the rulemaking before the measure becomes binding.

The policy matters to crypto markets because FinCEN expressly includes the ruble-linked A7A5 stablecoin within its proposed definition of convertible virtual currency. The agency says conventional restrictions on correspondent accounts would be insufficient because A7A5 transactions can move outside correspondent-banking channels.

What the proposal would cover

The rule targets transactions involving companies outside the United States that FinCEN identifies as A7 Network “Sub-Agents.” It would prohibit a covered financial institution from sending or receiving funds involving one of those companies, an account administered for one, or a crypto address administered by or for one.

FinCEN plans to distribute additional identifying information through a secure portal available to covered institutions rather than publish its complete list. The proposal also creates a reconsideration process for a company that disputes its classification as a sub-agent.

This is narrower than a prohibition on every transaction involving A7A5. The operative test would be whether a transfer involves an identified sub-agent, account or address. Existing Office of Foreign Assets Control requirements would continue to apply separately: where sanctions require blocking rather than rejection, the institution would follow the OFAC obligation.

Incoming blockchain transfers present another limitation. FinCEN acknowledges that institutions generally cannot prevent an outside address from sending assets to them. The proposal therefore gives institutions flexibility to handle crypto received despite efforts to avoid a prohibited transfer, reflecting the difference between rejecting a bank payment and stopping an irreversible blockchain transaction before receipt.

The government’s measurements and their limits

FinCEN says A7 Network sub-agents processed more than $17 billion in dollar-denominated transactions from January 2025 through June 2026. That is an agency aggregate based on public and nonpublic financial information, not an independently reproducible on-chain total.

Separately, FinCEN reports that more than 180 entities processed at least $179.1 billion in A7A5 transactions between February 2025 and June 2026. TRM Labs independently reports the same measurement and says its research informed the government’s assessment.

The larger token figure should not be read as $179.1 billion in unique external payments or settled bank value. FinCEN describes A7A5 as part of an internal accounting and mirror-payment system, so the total may include repeated token movements among network participants. The record does not provide a netted economic-value figure or establish how much of that activity touched U.S. institutions.

Why FinCEN chose a transfer prohibition

FinCEN formally found that transactions involving A7 sub-agents constitute a class of primary money-laundering concern connected to Russian illicit finance. The agency says the network used foreign companies, disguised trade documentation and crypto infrastructure to move funds for sanctioned Russian and Iranian actors and other illicit customers.

Those are government findings supporting a proposed special measure, not criminal judgments against every entity that may later appear on FinCEN’s confidential list. The final rule could change after comments, and identified companies would have a process to challenge their inclusion.

For financial institutions and crypto service providers, the immediate development is therefore procedural but consequential: a pending rule now specifies how a transfer-level prohibition could reach both conventional payments and blockchain addresses. The next material checkpoints are the November 4 comment deadline and any final rule FinCEN subsequently publishes.

Primary sourceFederal Register — FinCEN proposal on A7 Network sub-agents ↗

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